Liberal Nationalism in Iran: The Failure of a Movement by Sussan Siavoshi

Author:Sussan Siavoshi [Siavoshi, Sussan]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Middle Eastern, Social Science, Political Science, World, Regional Studies
ISBN: 9780429712876
Google: oXakDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 52484662
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-04-08T00:00:00+00:00

The Failure of the Second National Front: An Analysis

The formation of the second National Front in 1960 was an attempt to revive and redirect the Melli movement, which was once entrusted to Mosaddeq and the first National Front Assuming that the activities of the second National Front were in the tradition of the first National Front, two questions should be asked: (1) Why did the second National Front never seize power and form a government as Mosaddeq and the first National Front had done? and (2) Why did the second National Front fail to even remain a viable oppositional force in a relatively relaxed political atmosphere? Part of the answer to these questions lies in the dynamics of the relationships among the state, the society, and the international context in the 1960s compared to those in the early 1950s.

Iran's politico-economic situation and its relations with the outside world in 1960 differed from those of 1949 in many respects. After the 1953 coup d'etat, the United States undeniably became the dominant influence in Iran. The new oil agreement with the international consortium and American military and economic aid to the Shah's regime reinforced this influence. The regime and the Iranian economy as a whole became increasingly dependent on the United States. In the process, British political and economic influence rapidly decreased. Indeed, the British share in the new oil agreement was reduced from 100 percent to 40 percent. As a participant in the Baghdad Pact, Iran practically denounced the concept of non-alignment, and in 1959, at the height of the cold war, Iran sealed its military commitment to and dependence on the United States in a bilateral security agreement.

In addition to changes in the balance of power in the world as a whole, there were some related changes in the balance of power among different forces within Iran. Increased oil flow, military and economic aid, the creation of SAVAK, suppression of internal opposition, the development of a relatively powerful army under the Shah's control, and ten additional years of experience made the Pahlavi state much more powerful than before. Although still dependent upon and allied with the conservative forces, especially the landlord class, the Shah was in the process of breaking this alliance by building an autocracy protected by the army and security organizations and by eliminating the power of the landlord-dominated Majlis.

With regard to the internal opposition forces, the situation also differed from that of 1949-53. On the eve of the 1960 economic crisis, the Tudeh Party as an organization was virtually nonexistent within Iran. The popular movement was in eclipse due to the physical absence of Mosaddeq and the passivity of the other leaders, due to increased repression, and due to several years of a fairly stable and growing economy. Political parties such as the Iran Party or the Mellat Iran Party existed only in name.

However, two factors made the resurgence of organized political opposition possible. The first factor was the internal socioeconomic situation. In 1960, Iran faced an

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